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RACE-BASED LEGISLATIVE GERRYMANDERING:
HAVE WE REALLY GONE TOO FAR?
I. INTRODUCTION
The current crop of Supreme Court decisions on the use of race in legislative
redistricting has created many questions and issues that will shape the process of redis-
tricting for years to come. This Note will identify the predominant issues raised by
these decisions and decide what the proper role of the judiciary is in this area of the
law. The first part of this Note will discuss the substantive provisions of the Voting
Rights Act as they relate to recent important cases. The second part will provide a
synopsis of the recent cases in this field. The third part will summarize the action
taken by the states affected by the current litigation. Lastly, this note will provide
conclusions and recommendations in light of current voting rights theory.
II. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965: WHERE IT ALL BEGAN
The Voting Rights Act of 19651 was enacted in order to prohibit Southern states
from effectively blocking their black populations from being able to vote. In the cases
that the Supreme Court has recently decided, sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act
have been under intense scrutiny. It is important, then, to be familiar with the basic
provisions of Sections 2 and 5 before examining the relevant cases.
Section 2 provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice or proce-
dure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner
which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees...
as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the
totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this
section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the elec-
torate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to
office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be con-
sidered: Provided, that nothing in this section establishes a right to have members
1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in 42
U.S.C. §§1971-1973gg (1994)). This note only focuses on the substantive provisions applicable to the
cases cited within. For further discussion of the history of the Act, both procedural and legislative, see
Scott Gluck, Note, Congressional Reaction to Judicial Construction of Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBs. 337 (1996). For an in depth look at the nature of voting
rights claims today, see Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said:
"Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing?", 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1237 (1993).
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of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.2
As the Act was enacted originally, this section proposed only a purpose test: for
a plaintiff to prove a Section 2 violation, he or she had to prove that the intent of the
state legislature was to draw district lines based on race. In City of Mobile v. Bolden,3
the Supreme Court held that Section 2 was no different than the Fifteenth Amendment,
and as such, proof of intent was necessary to make a valid claim In 1982, Congress
amended Section 2 to read as it is above. Essentially, the amendments added a results
prong to the Act. The "totality of the circumstances" test was defined in Thornburg v.
Ginglesj in which the Supreme Court established the necessary elements for a claim
under the results prong of amended Section 2. Those elements are: (1) the minority
group must be "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority
in a single-member district," (2) the minority group must be "politically cohesive," and
(3) the minority group must prove that "the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc
to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate."' Because the
purpose prong is almost impossible to satisfy, most litigation arises from the results
prong of Section 2.6
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act reads as follows:
Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set
forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations made under the
first sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to ad-
minister any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November
1, 1964, or whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the
prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations
made under the second sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall
enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force
or effect on November 1, 1968, or whenever a State or political subdivision with
respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based
upon determinations made under the third sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title
are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequi-
site to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different
from that in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision may
institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice,
or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, and unless and until the
court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to
comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Pro-
vided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be
enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, prac-
2. 42 U.S.C. §1973b(a)-(b) (1994) [emphasis in original].
3. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
4. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
5. Id. at 50-1.
6. See generally Jennifer L. Gilg, Note, Back to the Drawing Board: Equal Protection Clashes
with the Voting Rights Act in Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816 (1993), 73 NEB. L. REV. 383, 389-93
(1994).
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tice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate
official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney Gen-
eral has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, or
upon good cause shown, to facilitate an expedited approval within sixty days after
such submission, the Attorney General has affirmatively indicated that such objec-
tion will not be made. Neither an affirmative indication by the Attorney General
that no objection will be made, nor the Attorney General's failure to object, nor a
declaratory judgment entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to
enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or proce-
dure .... Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court
of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28 and
any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.'
In essence, Section 5 is the "preclearance" provision of the Voting Rights Act.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b), the Attorney General may determine that certain counties
are covered jurisdictions because of past discrimination; then, the state has to submit
any change to their districting plan for preclearance' by the Attorney General. The
state has the alternative of petitioning for a declaratory judgment from the District
Court for the District of Columbia in lieu of getting preclearance from the Attorney
General.
The Supreme Court, in Beer v. United States,9 interpreted Section 5 to apply to
redistricting that "would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with
respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise."'0 The retrogression prin-
ciple of Beer has become the driving principle behind several states' redistricting plans
and has become the center of debate when the Court attempts to determine if a particu-
lar redistricting plan went beyond what was necessary under Section 5.
IH. SHAW V. RENO: NEW RULES
After the 1990 census, North Carolina became entitled to a twelfth seat in the
House of Representatives. As a result, the General Assembly of North Carolina passed
a new legislative districting plan that included one black-majority district. However,
forty of North Carolina's counties fell under the jurisdiction of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, forcing the state to send the plan to the Attorney General for
preclearance." The Attorney General objected to the plan, arguing that the state could
have made provisions for two black-majority districts. Pursuant to the Attorney
General's recommendations, the North Carolina General Assembly passed a second
redistricting plan creating two black-majority districts. The Attorney General did not
object to the new plan. Shortly thereafter, this suit was filed, alleging that the plan
constituted an improper racial gerrymander.
The minority districts created by the revised plan, the First and the Twelfth, were
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994) [emphasis in original].
8. The preclearance process is not necessarily an affirmative process, but is instead
one of a lack of opposition. The Attorney General does not have to affirmatively accept
a plan for it to be precleared, but must file an objection if the plan does not pass the
agency's approval. In that way, the Attorney General does not accept plans, but only
objects to them, if at all.
9. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
10. Id. at 141.
11. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 634 (1993) (hereinafter Shaw 1).
12. Id. at 634-35.
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both irregular in shape. The First District was located primarily in the northeast portion
of the state, but hooked down in a narrow band into the southern portion of the state,
almost to the South Carolina border. 3
The Twelfth District is described as such:
[Alpproximately 160 miles long, and, for much of its length, no wider than the I-
85 corridor .... Of the 10 counties through which District 12 passes, five are cut
into three different districts; even towns are divided. At one point, the district re-
mains contiguous only because it intersects at a single point with two other districts
before crossing over them."
The plaintiffs maintained that the districts were drawn with the sole purpose of creat-
ing black-majority districts, and that the General Assembly disregarded traditional
divisional boundaries, thus engaging in an impermissible racial gerrymander prohibited
by the Fourteenth Amendment.
More specifically, the suit alleged that the districts were drawn to ensure that two
black representatives would be elected in the new districts. The special judicial panel
had dismissed the appellants' claims.' The essential holding in the case was two-fold.
The three-judge panel first held that districting by race is permissible only to the extent
that it does not dilute white voting strength using the "one-person, one-vote" princi-
ple. 6 The panel stated that the plan did not lead to a disproportionately low represen-
tation of white voters. Second, the panel held that because the General Assembly in-
tended to comply with the Voting Rights Act, the legislature acted constitutionally. 7
The Supreme Court had two issues to decide: whether this was a vote dilution
case, and whether this redistricting plan was warranted under the Voting Rights Act.
The majority of the Court, speaking through Justice O'Connor, first emphasized the
distinction between this case and the earlier vote-dilution. The plaintiffs in this case,
according to O'Connor, brought a claim alleging that the districts were drawn in such
an irregular fashion that they could only have been drawn "as an effort to segregate
the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and
without sufficiently compelling justification."'8 The Court held that this was indeed a
question of an impermissible racial gerrymander, under the Equal Protection Clause,
and therefore constituted a claim upon which relief could be granted. 9
From this, the Court began its' analysis of the North Carolina redistricting plan
under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court held that redistricting legislation "so
bizarre on its face that it is 'unexplainable on grounds other than race,' demands the
13. Id. at 635.
14. Id. at 635-36.
15. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
16. Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 638. The case relied upon by the three-judge panel was United
Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (hereinafter UJO). That
case was similar in that it dealt with a redistricting plan that included new majority-
minority districts after the Attorney General recommended the state do so. The Court
held that the plan was legal and did not dilute white voting strength. This is in con-
trast to the claims of the plaintiffs in this case that the districts were drawn in a bi-
zarre fashion with race as .their only determinant factor. Ultimately, UJO established
the "one person-one vote" principle, which states that each person is guaranteed the
right to cast a meaningful ballot under the law.
17. Shaw, 808 F.Supp. 461.




same close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race."'2 By
this, the Court determined that racial reapportionment plans must pass strict scrutiny to
be considered constitutional; the plan must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling
governmental interest. Further, the Court held that redistricting plans drawn with the
sole purpose of separating voters by race must be examined under strict scrutiny re-
gardless of the reasons or motivations for enacting the plan."
There are two rules to be taken from the majority holding. First, the Court de-
mands that districts be drawn according to traditional districting principles: "compact-
ness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions."'22 Second, the Court provides
that a plaintiff challenging a redistricting plan under the Equal Protection Clause state
his or her claim in this manner:
[Bly alleging that the legislation, though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot
be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different
districts on the basis of race, and the separation lacks sufficient justification.23
The Court, by enacting these standards, stated that race cannot be the compelling fac-
tor in drawing district lines and that shape is a primary determinant in elevating the
plan to strict scrutiny analysis.
The Court proffered several reasons for their main holding. First, the Court said
that racial gerrymandering assumes that all members of a racial group are going to
vote for the same candidates. The Court argued that such a separation of voters is
racial segregation, something that the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to combat.
Furthermore, the Court stated that legislators elected from those districts would feel
obligated to represent the predominant racial group in the district and not the constitu-
ency as a whole, because of the emphasis placed on that group by creating a district
for them. By this, the Court professed the belief that voting systems must be created in
a color-blind fashion so as not to give any racial group greater or lesser effect on the.
election of representatives to government.24
The state had argued that there was a compelling interest in drawing two black-
majority districts in order to bring the redistricting plan into compliance with the Vot-
ing Rights Act. The Court explained that there is indeed a compelling state interest in
following laws that are both constitutional in their interpretation and their application.
However, O'Connor drew a distinction between what the law allows and what the law
requires. In this case, O'Connor deferred to the rule that the Court expressed in
Beer.'5 O'Connor explained that Beer held that a narrowly tailored redistricting plan
will only do that which reasonably avoids retrogression. If a state goes beyond what a
court considers to be reasonable, the plan is unconstitutional. Further, a state enacting a
redistricting plan pursuant to the Attorney General's recommendations can still have
the plan ruled unconstitutional if it goes farther than what is reasonable to avoid retro-
gression. The Court held that this is consistent with the strict scrutiny standard.
North Carolina also defended their plan as a protection against the dilution of
20. Id. at 644 (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266 (1977)).
21. Id. at 645.
22. Id. at 647.
23. Id. at 649.
24. Id.
25. See note 8, supra, and accompanying text.
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black voting strength, preventing a Section 2 violation, as the state construed the
Gingles test.26 The Court rejected this argument, holding that the group in question is
too disperse to satisfy the first part of the Gingles test, and that fear of a Section 2
violation was not a legitimate factor in drawing districts. The Supreme Court sent the
case back to the judicial panel on remand, holding that there was a cognizable claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment, and ordered the panel to apply strict scrutiny to the
plan. The Court, however, did not address the issue of whether Sections 2 and 5 of the
Voting Rights Act are constitutional; it simply stated that the question at hand was the
level of constitutional scrutiny required of racial redistricting plans.
Justice White, in his dissent, stated that until the Shaw I opinion, there had only
been two kinds of state voting practices that were allowed to rise to the level of a
constitutional claim. The first was a "direct and outright deprivation" of the right to
vote.2 The second was vote dilution.28 White argued that the claim at issue in this
case was essentially vote dilution. What White saw as the issue here was whether the
newly drawn districts took power away from white voters to participate in the voting
process. Justice White believed that the case should have been resolved by simple
application of the UJO one person-one vote doctrine.
White also argued that the new criteria laid out by the majority will have an
adverse impact on the future of districting with race as a factor. He posited that while
bizarrely drawn districts may point to a potential racial gerrymander, "they do no more
than that."" This meant, according to Justice White, that state legislatures will have
to draw compact and contiguous districts when attempting to maximize minority partic-
ipation, even if the potentially bizarre shape of the proposed district is the product of
another concern, such as incumbency protection.' Justice White argued that the
North Carolina plan was narrowly tailored to meet the Attorney General's objection to
the plan, and to protect several state interests, like protection of incumbents and com-
promise between state political players.31 By maintaining that a plan may be narrow-
ly tailored as a response to a prior objection by the Attorney General, Justice White
said, in effect, that the Attorney General has the power to determine that minority
participation in the electoral process needs to be increased under the Voting Rights
Act.
Justice Souter, in his dissent, followed a different path than did Justice White.
Justice Souter argued that the majority was wrong to place voting rights cases on the
same constitutional plane as other equal protection claims involving governmental
conduct. He posited first that districting must bear race in mind, especially in a racial-
ly-mixed area.32 Second, he argued that other cases involving governmental conduct
usually involve a scenario where using race to benefit one group necessarily was to the
detriment of another.33 Souter posited that drawing districts to increase minority par-
ticipation does not, in most cases, harm the majority in the state. He stated that voting
rights cases should not be subject to the same level of constitutional scrutiny to which
26. See note 5, supra, and accompanying text.
27. Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 659.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 672.
30. Id. at 673.
31. Id. at 674.
32. Id. at 680.
33. Id. at 681.
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other state actions is and should be subject.'
Simply stated, Souter's position is this: in redistricting cases, an intermediate
level of scrutiny should be applied. Voting rights claims with a cognizable injury fall
into one of two categories: vote dilution or vote abridgement (the same categories as
applied by Justice White). If the redistricting plan falls into one or the other, then the
plan must pass constitutional scrutiny." If not, then it should be considered a "be-
nign" discriminatory practice in pursuit of some legitimate governmental purpose, and
allowed.
IV. SHAW V. HUNT: THE REMAND
In August, 1994, the special judicial panel handed down their decision in the
remand of the Shaw v. Reno decision. Shaw v. Hunt36 was an 88 page opinion, writ-
ten by Judge Phillips, which upheld the North Carolina redistricting plan of 1992. The
panel ruled that the redistricting plan was narrowly tailored to further a compelling
state interest, thus holding that the plan passed the strict scrutiny analysis ordered by
the Supreme Court.
A. Procedural History and Background
The panel first summarized the procedural and factual details of the case. The
panel reiterated its holding from Shaw v. Hunt: that the plaintiffs had not made a cog-
nizable claim against the state because the plaintiffs had not suffered a cognizable
injury.37 The panel stated that the only issue to be decided on remand was whether
the plaintiffs claim that the redistricting plan was a racial gerrymander in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause was valid. 8 Upon remand, the state defendants amended
their response, stating that one of the reasons the state drew the revised plan was to
respond to the Attorney General's objections, and the state created two majority-minor-
ity districts as the Attorney General suggested. The state further contended in their
amended response that the plan was not a racial gerrymander because it integrated
districts and drew the district lines based on legitimate districting principles: incum-
bent protection, one person-one vote restrictions, and the creation of districts that
shared common economic and social values. 9
B. General Legal Principles
In this section of the opinion, Judge Phillips gave a four-part analysis of the
Equal Protection Claim to be decided on remand.
1. General Nature of the Claim
Judge Phillips stated that the plaintiffs' initial Equal Protection claim was a bifur-
cated one. First, the plaintiffs alleged that districts drawn with race as the predominant
factor violated the Equal Protection Clause, regardless of justification. Second, the
plaintiffs alleged that, even if race-based redistricting is not per se unconstitutional,
34. Id.
35. Id. at 683-85.
36. 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (hereinafter Shaw I).
37. Id. at 419.




this particular plan was unconstitutional because it did not rely on traditional districting
principles.' ° The second claim was that which the plaintiffs pursued on remand.
Judge Phillips recognized only two previous claims to voting rights violation
under Equal Protection: a claim that a redistricting plan violated the one person-one
vote doctrine, or that a redistricting plan diluted the voting strength of a minority
group. 1 Two points were made: 1) until Shaw I, the Supreme Court had never held a
redistricting plan that did not cause a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs, and 2) UJO
held that states could draw districts based on race to comply with the Voting Rights
Act, as long as they did not dilute voting strength or preclude any racial minority from
participating in the electoral process.' 2 They interpreted Shaw I as providing a third
claim, when a state segregates voters into districts based on race without "sufficient
justification."' 3
If that was the nature of the claim, the panel said, then there are certain problems
in application of the general Equal Protection model to the specialized facts of voting
rights claims. Specifically, the panel pointed out these: "the problem of standing; the
nature of the showing required to trigger strict scrutiny; the allocation of the burden of
proof at the strict scrutiny stage; the types of compelling state interests that might
justify such race-based action, and the meaning of narrowly tailored in this context. "'
The panel dealt with each of these issues separately.
2. Standing
While the defendants argued that the plaintiffs had no standing to assert a claim
because of the lack of an identifiable injury to white voters, the panel disagreed. Judge
Phillips interpreted the Shaw I opinion as granting standing to white voters on the basis
that the injury in fact is the characterization of voters as part of a racial class instead
of as individuals. Thus, any registered voter in a jurisdiction that has enacted a racial
redistricting plan, whether the voter lives in one of the affected districts or not, has
standing to sue.'
3. Proof Required to Trigger Strict Scrutiny
The panel's interpretation of the Shaw I decision led it to hold that strict scrutiny
is triggered in redistricting cases when there is proof that race was a motivating factor
in drawing new districts, whether by concessions by the state of the use of race, the
bizarre shape of districts, or other determinant factors of racial intent as set down by
the Supreme Court. This means, in Judge Phillips's view, that strict scrutiny is used
when race is the predominant factor, even if it can be shown that the exact shape and
placement of the district was ultimately decided by other factors. 6 North Carolina had
argued that Shaw I would require all redistricting plans to undergo the strict scrutiny
analysis, because it is always possible to show that a state was considering the racial
impact of redistricting plans to some degree. 7 The panel countered stating that mere
40. Id. at 421.
41. Id. at 421-22.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 422 (quoting Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 649 (1993) (citation omitted)).
44. Id. at 423.
45. Id. at 426-27. The standing issue is dealt with in Hays v. Louisiana discussed infra.
46. Id. at 431.
47. Id. at 433.
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knowledge would not trigger strict scrutiny. Taking "race-conscious" action is different
from taking "race-based" action, and the Supreme Court exacts strict scrutiny analysis
on the latter, but not the former.48 Therefore, states could keep race in mind while
drawing districts without constitutional infirmity, but must be acting upon other legiti-
mate districting principles.
In a footnote, the majority identified two instances in which strict scrutiny will
be consistently triggered. The first instance is that in which the plan draws more ma-
jority-minority districts than the plan before it had, and that it was drawn either in
response to a private suit or an objection by the Attorney General. The second instance
is cases in which a particular racial group is concentrated in numbers larger than their
proportionate percentage of the population as a whole, and the shape of the districts is
so irregular that it can be inferred that race was the predominant factor. Otherwise, the
panel held that strict scrutiny is difficult to trigger because districts that do not fall into
these two categories are drawn pursuant to other factors, with race only being a com-
ponent of the whole decision-making process.49
4. Application of the Strict Scrutiny Standard in the Redistricting Context
Due to certain differences between voting rights cases and racial preferences
cases in, for instance, hiring or granting government contracts, the panel pointed out
that there are inherent difficulties in applying the strict scrutiny standard to the unique
situation arising in the voting rights context. Those differences are: (1) the Voting
Rights Act mandates that states give effect to minority voting strength, while other
types of racial preferences to which strict scrutiny is applied do not have such Con-
gressional approval, (2) voting is sacrosanct to the stability and legitimacy of our
method of government, (3) the remedy that the Voting Rights Act provides is felt first-
hand by those who have been discriminated against by the voting schemes the Voting
Rights Acts seeks to change, and (4) attempting to even out minority voting strength to
proportionate levels does not inherently take away from another racial group like naked
preferences do in other contexts involving racial set-asides or preferences. 0
The first of the inherent difficulties enumerated by the panel was identifying the
necessary burden of proof. The panel here held that the state need simply offer a
"compelling justification" for the use of race in a particular redistricting plan: the
plaintiff must then prove that either the justification is not compelling, or that the plan
is not narrowly tailored to further the interest.5 Further, Judge Phillips found that the
plaintiff, once the burden of proof has shifted, must also prove that the plan did not
serve a remedial purpose or had the effect of violating Equal Protection rights.52
The second difficulty in applying the strict scrutiny standard is identifying the
compelling state interest. Judge Phillips first distinguished that the issue at hand was
not whether North Carolina had a compelling interest in enacting this particular redis-
tricting plan, as the plaintiffs in this case suggested, but whether North Carolina had a
compelling interest to enact any race-based redistricting plan.53 The panel then exam-
48. Id.
49. Id. at 433 n. 20.
50. Id. at 434-35.
51. Id. at 436.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 437.
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ined the two interests offered by the state: compliance with the Voting Rights Act and
"eradicati[on of] the effects of past and present racial discrimination in North
Carolina's political processes."'
The panel found that a state does have a compelling interest in compliance with
the Voting Rights Act. The test that the panel used was that a state has a compelling
interest in drawing districts based on race if the state has a "strong basis in evidence"
that such districting is "necessary to prevent its electoral districting scheme from vio-
lating the Voting Rights Act."55 The panel added that there is nothing in the Shaw I
decision that indicates that a state does not have a compelling interest in complying
with the Voting Rights Act.56 A state has a "strong basis in evidence" to engage in
racial redistricting when it has "information sufficient to support a prima facie show-
ing" that the state would otherwise be in violation of the Voting Rights Act.57
The panel found that there are at least two instances where a state would have
the requisite "strong basis in evidence" for a race-based plan. The first is if the state
determines that a relevant minority group passes the Gingles test, and that there may
be a Section 2 violation." The second is if a state is subject to Section 5 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act,59 and a previous plan is objected to by the Attorney General for fail-
ure to pay attention to minority voting strength, or a denial of declaratory relief by the
District Court for the District of Columbia.' The panel also held that the state has a
compelling interest to "eradicate the effects of past or present racial discrimination in
its political processes, even when it has no basis for believing that the Voting Rights
Act requires it to do so."6 Again, the state must have a "strong basis in evidence"
that redistricting based on race is necessary to remedy such past discriminatory practic-
es.
62
The third difficulty is determining if the plan is narrowly tailored. The panel
enumerated five factors that the Supreme Court has looked to in determining whether
race-based affirmative action programs are narrowly tailored: (1) "the efficacy of alter-
native remedies," (2) "whether the program imposes a rigid racial 'quota' or just a
flexible racial goal," (3) "the planned duration of the program," (4) "the relationship
between the program's goal for minority representation in the pool of individuals ulti-
mately selected to receive the benefit in question and the percentage of minorities in
the relevant pool of eligible candidates," and (5) "the impact of the program on the
rights of innocent third parties."63
The panel pointed out that these factors should be easy to apply to voting rights
cases. Judge Phillips went on to explain the impact that each of these factors would
have on racial redistricting plans. The first factor would require states to ensure that
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 438.
57. Id. at 439.
58. Id. at 440.
59. It is important to remember here the two pronged analysis that §5 of the Voting
Rights Act provides: the effect prong and the purpose prong. Failure to preclear on the
basis of either of the two prongs, in the district court's eyes, gives a "sufficient basis in
evidence." Id. at 442.
60. Id at 441.
61. Id. at 443.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 445.
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the proposed redistricting plan not go farther than is necessary to further a state inter-
est in using race as a factor.' The second factor would require states to recognize the
difference between guaranteeing results and increasing minority participation propor-
tional to their percentage of the overall number of voters. The former would be an
improper racial quota, the latter, a permissible flexible goal.65 The third factor re-
quires states to enact a measure that prescribes a period after which the plan must be
reevaluated to ensure that it does not outlive its usefulness.? The fourth factor re-
quires the state to ensure that the number of majority-minority districts corresponds
with the percentage of the minority group compared to the entire voting public." The
fifth factor requires that the state cannot unduly impose on the rights of third parties.
The panel held that this factor would be violated if the state's plan was not narrowly
tailored, if it violated the one person-one vote doctrine, or if it served to dilute minori-
ty voting strength. The panel here, however, refused to hold that a burden is placed on
third parties if the state does not rely on traditional districting notions of compactness
and respect for political subdivisions. The panel insisted, as did the majority in Shaw I,
that these notions are not constitutional requirements for drawing districts.68
The panel insisted that the proper reading of Shaw I is that rational districting
principles need be used only to ensure that the redistricting plan maintain "fair and
effective representation to all citizens."'69 Therefore, a state could deviate from ratio-
nal districting principles and still have a plan considered to be narrowly tailored, as
long as it is necessary to further the state's compelling interest for drawing district
lines based on race.7' Judge Phillips argued that the Supreme Court would never
adopt a definition of narrowly tailored in the voting rights area that required the use of
traditional districting principles of compactness, contiguity and respect for political
subdivisions. He gave three reasons for this argument. First, he argued that those prin-
ciples do not ensure that districts will be drawn any more fairly than if they are not
used. In fact, he stated, modem technology has made those principles even less impor-
tant by allowing representatives to have closer contact with his or her constituents
without having to ensure close proximity.7 Second, Judge Phillips explained that
there is no "judicially manageable standard" to determine if a plan that does not use
those principles varies beyond what is reasonably necessary to effectuate the state's
purpose for using race in redistricting.' Finally, he said, there is no general definition
of a compact district simple enough to be judicially manageable."
Judge Phillips's final comment on the narrowly tailored standard, aside from the
enumerated difficulties above, was a concern that a restrictive notion of narrowly tai-
lored would result in undesirable levels of judicial involvement in the generally politi-
cal field of redistricting. If the judiciary interferes too much, reasoned Phillips, then the
balance of competing political interests in redistricting legislation would be unduly
64. Id. at 445-46.
65. Id. at 446.
66. Id. at 447.
67. Id. at 447-48.
68. Id. at 449-50.
69. Id. at 450.
70. Id. at 451.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 452 (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 149 (1985)).
73. Id. at 453.
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upset. Phillips argued that the Shaw I notion of compact and aesthetically pleasing
districts simply places an undue burden on states acting within the bounds of a legiti-
mate state purpose.74
C. The Dissent
Judge Richard Voorhies filed a dissent disagreeing with the majority in its funda-
mental reading of Shaw L Specifically, he disagreed with the majority's decision to
rule against the findings of the Supreme Court in Shaw L He argued that the
majority's disregard for the use of traditional districting principles was blatant igno-
rance of the express mandate handed down by the Supreme Court."' Judge Voorhies
said that the majority had a lack of justification in considering the redistricting plan to
be constitutional under the strict scrutiny standard.
First, Judge Voorhies found that the redistricting plan did not have sufficient
justification because blacks were not sufficiently geographically compact to pass the
Gingles test under Section 2.76 Judge Voorhies pointed to the shape of District 12 to
evidence that fact.7 Furthermore, he argued that North Carolina did not have a com-
pelling interest to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, since the minority
group in question did not pass muster under the Gingles test. Judge Voorhies argued
that drawing a district so as to bring together a geographically disperse minority group
is akin to setting a racial quota of proportional representation.
The Voting Rights Act, according to Judge Voorhies, promises only equal oppor-
tunity to participate in the electoral process and does not go so far as to guarantee
proportional representation. The panel was attempting to guarantee the opportunity for
minorities to elect the candidate of their choice. Judge Voorhies found that to be im-
permissible and beyond the scope that the Voting Rights Act was intended to have.79
He argued that the state did not have a compelling interest in complying with Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act. According to Judge Voorhies, the state could not simply
use a denial of preclearance from the Attorney General as evidence of a compelling
interest. Rather, the state could have presented the plan to the District Court for the
District of Columbia to gain preclearance. Judge Voorhies described the revised redis-
tricting plan as illegitimate in that the prior plan may have been precleared with further
action on the part of the state."0
Finally, Judge Voorhies asserted that the redistricting plan was not narrowly
tailored. Voorhies argued that there were less restrictive means available for remedying
past wrongs. The plan, as Judge Voorhies described it, went beyond the constitutional
scope of the Voting Rights Act, and thus did not pass strict scrutiny.8" Judge Voorhies
said it was the express province of the courts to set the constitutional standards to be
used in race-conscious redistricting, rather than have those standards be defined by the
political process.s2
74. Id. at 453-54.
75. Id. at 479.
76. Id. at 482.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 483.
79. Id. at 485.
80. Id. at 486-87.
81. Id. at 492-93.
82. Id. at 495.
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V. MILLER V. JOHNSON: GEORGIA ENTERS THE FRAY
In 1995, the Supreme Court handed down a decision in Miller v. Johnson83 , a
voting rights case from Georgia with facts akin to those in Shaw I. Georgia was named
a covered jurisdiction under the Voting Rights Act in 1965. This meant, as it did to the
counties in question in North Carolina, that the state had to gain preclearance of any
redistricting plan either by the Attorney General or by the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia." The 1990 census showed that Georgia was entitled to an eleventh
congressional seat, pursuant to which the Georgia General Assembly instituted a redis-
tricting plan to establish the new district. 5
The first redistricting plan that the General Assembly drew in 1991 provided for
two majority-minority districts-the Fifth and the Eleventh-and a third in which
blacks comprised 35% of the voting population. 6 The Attorney General objected to
this plan, stating that the plan did not "recognize" certain minority groups by giving
them their own majority-minority districts." The state then presented a second plan,
still with two majority-minority districts, which increased the minority population in
the two majority-minority districts and the Second district, which had a 35% black
population. The Attorney General again objected to the plan, insisting that a third
majority-minority district be drawn. The Attorney General had been swayed by evi-
dence of an alternative redistricting plan called the "max-black" plan, drawn primarily
by the American Civil Liberties Union, which created three black-majority districts."
Instead of seeking a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District
of Columbia, the General Assembly used the "max-black" plan as a guideline in draw-
ing the third and final plan. Elections under this new plan resulted in the election of
black Congressmen from each of the three majority-minority districts. 'In 1994, five
white voters from the new black-majority Eleventh District sued, arguing that the re-
districting plan was a racial gerrymander under Shaw L9 The District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia held the plan unconstitutional under Shaw 1, stating that,
while pursuant to the state's compelling interest in compliance with the Voting Rights
Act, it was not narrowly tailored insofar as it found that three majority-minority dis-
tricts were more than was necessary.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, clarified the proper scope and
meaning of the Supreme Court's ruling in Shaw I and applied it to this case. First,
Kennedy held that the appellants misconstrued the holding in Shaw L The appellants'
argument was that a plaintiff, when alleging an improper racial gerrymander, must
prove that a district is so bizarrely drawn as to have no other explanation other than
race in order to state a winning claim.' Justice Kennedy stated that the proper read-
ing of Shaw I is that shape is not an element of a claim of unconstitutional racial ger-
rymandering, but is simply circumstantial indicia that race was a motivating factor in
drawing district lines. Further, Shaw I mandated the application of strict scrutiny not
83. 115 S.Ct. 2475 (1995).
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only on redistricting plans that expressly classify on the basis of race, but also those
that are facially race-neutral but motivated by racial considerations.91
Before discussing the proper requirements of proof under Shaw I, Justice Kenne-
dy expressed his feeling that redistricting is properly left to the state legislatures until a
plaintiff can adequately prove that improper methods were used. Otherwise, Justice
Kennedy argued that the legislatures are the best forum in which to balance competing
political interests.' From that Justice Kennedy crystallized the burden of proof that
Shaw I mandated:
The plaintiffs burden is to show, either through circumstantial evidence of a
district's shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative
purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision
to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district. To
make this showing, a plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated tradi-
tional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness,
contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual
shared interests, to racial consideration. Where these or other race-neutral consider-
ations are the basis for redistricting legislation, and are not subordinated to race, a
state can "defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines.
93
Justice Kennedy further stated that these principles should guide courts in determining
whether or not to intrude on an otherwise legislative process.'
Since the state's plan did not overcome this burden of proof, then the plan must
survive strict scrutiny. In applying strict scrutiny, Justice Kennedy argued that attempt-
ing to gain preclearance from the Attorney General is not the same as complying with
the Voting Rights Act, unless it required the action under its express provisions."
Justice Kennedy speculated that if the Court were to allow attempting to gain
preclearance as a compelling interest, then "we would be surrendering to the Executive
Branch our role in enforcing the constitutional limits on race-based official action."96
A lower court must make their own determination of the true meaning of the Voting
Rights Act, and not defer to the view of the Attorney General. 7
The Court objected to using the issue of preclearance as a compelling interest
because the Attorney General was pursuing ends not prescribed by the Voting Rights
Act. Justice Kennedy wrote that the Attorney General was not concerned with whether
the plan discriminated in violation of the Constitution, but rather in maximizing minor-
ity voting strength. This, according to the Court, went beyond the scope of the Voting
Rights Act, and the state lost its compelling interest.98 The Court sent the case back
to the District Court on remand for further proceedings consistent with its decision.
Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, stated that there were four points on which there
was dgreement on the Court: 1) that redistricting is best left to the state and warrants
limited judicial intervention; 2) that the right of franchise has not been equally enjoyed
91. Id. at 2485-87.
92. Id. at 2488.
93. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 647 (1993)).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2491.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2492.
[Vol. 23:119
Legislative Gerrymandering
by blacks as has been for whites in our country's history; 3) that state legislatures
sometimes have to consider race in redistricting to meet certain statutory requirements,
and 4) that state legislatures may group certain ethnic or racial groups in the same
district because they share certain common interests.99
Justice Ginsburg argued that the main point of discussion is simply whether
Georgia improperly used race in drawing its district lines. Justice Ginsburg argued that
Georgia did indeed use traditional districting principles in attempting to group people
together with common backgrounds and experiences. Furthermore, Georgia could have
asked for declaratory relief in the District Court for the District of Columbia, but in-
stead attempted to meet the criteria set out by the Attorney General. Because of this,
the state's plan should remain intact as a genuine attempt to comply with the law."°
Essentially, Justice Ginsburg argued that attempting to meet preclearance stan-
dards serves as a compelling interest. Justice Ginsburg ended her dissent by offering
two pieces of advice to courts and lawmakers. First, it is impossible to think of redis-
tricting as treating people as individuals. When states draw districts, they do not use
the same standards as when making personal decisions like in hiring or contracting,
and must not be held to the same constitutional standards to which those decisions are
held. Second, the Court's holding opens the floodgate for voting rights litigation by
allowing suits to be brought if traditional districting principles are not given the same
weight as racial considerations, even if the latter is more pressing. In doing so, said
Ginsburg, the Court made the assurance of legality in redistricting rest solely on the
outcome of litigation, and took redistricting out of the political context and into the
judicial sphere."°
VI. SHAW V. HUNT: THIRD TIME'S THE CHARM
Shaw v. Hunt °3 represents the Supreme Court's final response to the North
Carolina redistricting plan initially decided upon in Shaw L However, two things hap-
pened between the panel's remand decision and the case here. First, the Miller decision
was handed down, setting further restrictions on racial redistricting and clarifying
Shaw I. Second, the Court had decided Louisiana v. Hays." In Hays, the Court de-
termined the proper threshold for standing in racial redistricting cases. The Court held
that the plaintiff must either a) reside in a district that is an alleged racial gerrymander,
or b) show that he or she was subject to a racial classification even though he or she
lives outside a district considered to be a racial gerrymander."
Justice Rehnquist, in the majority opinion, rejected the decision of the panel.
First, the Court resolved a question of standing. Of the five plaintiffs, only two lived in
a district affected by the racial gerrymander-in this case, the Twelfth District. The
other three plaintiffs did not live in the First District, nor did they show evidence that
the alleged racial gerrymander affected their own voting rights. Thus, those plaintiffs
were denied standing and the suit was focused on the constitutional legitimacy of
99. Id. at 2500.
100. Id. at 2504.
101. Id. at 2506.
102. Id. at 2507.
103. 116 S.Ct. 1894 (1996) (hereinafter Shaw v. Hunt).
104. 115 S.Ct. 2431 (1995) (hereinafter Hays).




North Carolina offered three interests to support the drawing of the District
Twelve: (1) "to eradicate the effects of past and present discrimination,"; (2) "to com-
ply with §5 of the Voting Rights Act,"; and (3) "to comply with §2 of the Voting
Rights Act."' 1 The Court made separate consideration of each of these. On the first
point, the Court simply argued that under precedent the state had to point to specific
instances of past discrimination that needed remedy, and the state did not do so.'°8
Next, the Court moved on to the larger issue of compliance with the Voting Rights
Act.
The Court's statement on the compliance issue was this:
"... [W]e find that creating an additional majority-black district was not required
under a correct reading of §5 and that District 12, as drawn, is not a remedy nar-
rowly tailored to the State's professed interest in avoiding §2 liability."'
The Court said that under their decision in Miller, the state cannot violate Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act unless the redistricting plan discriminates to the point of violat-
ing the Constitution. Further, the Court stated that the Attorney General cannot refuse
to preclear a plan because a state relies on other districting principles instead of at-
tempting to maximize minority voting strength. The Attorney General in both this case
and in Miller followed a program of maximization not prescribed under Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act.11
As for the state's other argument that a second majority-minority district had to
be drawn to avoid liability under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the Court did not
directly refute this argument. Instead, the Court stated that, assuming that Section 2
compliance was a compelling interest, and assuming that the state had strong basis in
evidence that a second majority-minority district was needed to escape Section 2 liabil-
ity, District Twelve was still not narrowly tailored to achieve that end."' The Court
stated that though the exact definition of narrowly tailored is hazy, one could neverthe-
less see by looking at District Twelve that the population covered by the district was
not "geographically compact," failing the Gingles test for a Section 2 violation. The
state lost its argument that the plan was narrowly tailored, and failed strict scruti-
ny.11
2
North Carolina contended that if a state had a strong basis in evidence that there
could exist a Section 2 violation in the state, then the state could draw a new majority-
minority district anywhere in the state. The Court rejected this argument as well. If the
state was allowed to do this, then the district would not remedy the alleged vote dilu-
tion in the area it was thought to exist. Rather, the remedy would be extended to the
race as a whole and not the individuals involved. The right to vote, the Court ex-
plained, belongs to the individual, not the race. That being said, the Court reversed the
judgment of the panel, and ruled that District Twelve was unconstitutional. 1 3
106. Shaw v. Hunt at 1900.
107. Id. at 1902.
108. Id. at 1902-03.
109. Id. at 1903.
110. Id. at 1904.
111. Id. at 1905.
112. Id. at 1905-06.
113. Id. at 1906-07.
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In his dissent, Justice Stevens made several points. First, Justice Stevens opined
that the majority's insistence that federal judges would not be able to discern racially
neutral districting principles from pretextual ones is false. He argued that the record
showed that North Carolina drew a second majority-minority district to keep from
violating the Voting Rights Act, and could not help but make race an overriding con-
cern. Further, the evidence that other interests may have led to the shape of the
Twelfth District should override the supposition that the bizarre shape could only be
explained by race. In fact, Justice Stevens argued that there was evidence that other
concerns did explain the shape of the district, and that race was only one of those
concerns. It would have been better, in his view, if the Court had remanded the case
back to the panel to apply the Miller standard." 4
Justice Stevens explained that the state had a compelling interest not only in
remedying past discrimination, but also in avoiding the litigation that would have been
necessary to overcome the Attorney General's objection to the proposed plan. He ar-
gued that it makes no sense that a state must formulate a plan with a remedial purpose
if the intent is only to avoid litigation. In sum, Justice Stevens stated that the pro-
posed plan showed both a compelling interest in protecting incumbents, preserving
communities of interest and avoiding litigation, and the plan was narrowly tailored to
accomplish those goals." 5
VII. BUSH V. VERA: SHAW VISITS TEXAS
On the same day that Shaw v. Hunt was decided, the Court also handed down a
ruling on a Texas case dealing with a similar racial gerrymander. Bush v. Vera".6 al-
so arose out of changes from the 1990 Census. It was established that Texas would
gain an additional three congressional seats, and, accordingly, the Texas Legislature
enacted a new redistricting plan. In this case, the state created two new majority-mi-
nority districts: District 30, a black-majority district, and District 29, an Hispanic ma-
jority district. It also redrew District 18 to make it a black-majority district. The Attor-
ney General precleared the redistricting plan, and the plan was used in the 1992 elec-
tions."'
The six plaintiffs challenged 24 of 30 districts, asserting that those districts were
impermissible racial gerrymanders. The District Court ruled that only Districts 18, 29
and 30 were unconstitutional gerrymanders under the standards elucidated in Shaw
I'8 The Supreme Court agreed that those districts warranted the application of strict
scrutiny, and held that the districts were not narrowly tailored to pass the strict scrutiny
test. The majority opinion was written by Justice O'Connor. The Court first decided
whether the application of strict scrutiny to Districts 18, 29 and 30 was warranted. The
Court reiterated the basic holding from Miller that a plaintiff must prove that legiti-
mate redistricting principles were "subordinated" to race."9 The Court acknowledged,
however, that this case was different than those previously decided. Although the state
of Texas stipulated that they used race as a factor in drawing district lines, the Texas
114. Id. at 1915-17.
115. Id. at 1920-22.
116. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
117. Id. at 1950-51.




Legislature also based its decision on other, more traditional, districting principles,
especially incumbent protection. As such, the record did not indicate that district lines
were drawn solely on the basis of race, but rather with race in mind.12
At trial, the District Court found that Texas usually abided by traditional
districting principles, and that the Legislature had indeed committed itself to maximiz-
ing voting opportunity from the outset."' The Supreme Court found this, and the
districting methods the Legislature used to drawing new districts, to be persuasive in
deciding to apply strict scrutiny. The Legislature used a computer data program called
"REDAPPL", which allowed the Legislature to upload the racial makeup of Texas on a
block-by-block basis; this was added to other demographic data that was only avail-
able by voting precinct.' In other words, the precision with which the Legislature
could view racial data probably explained the ultimate shape of the districts. However,
there was evidence that incumbent protection may have been a determinant factor as
well. In the 1992 elections, the first time the new districting plan, only one of the 27
incumbents up for reelection lost.' Further, Districts 18 and 29 seemed to follow
county lines, and were drawn with a major city at the center and spreading into outly-
ing areas." None of the districts had the dispersed characteristics of the North Car-
olina districts in Shaw I125
Despite Texas' assertion that other districting principles played as much a role in
the redistricting process as race, the Supreme Court looked at each district separately
to decide the appropriateness of applying strict scrutiny. The first was District 30.
District 30 was a 50% black and 17% Hispanic district with its core located in south-
ern Dallas and extending out in seven arms to the suburbs, collecting pockets of mi-
nority voters. Texas agreed that traditional districting principles like compactness were
not followed, but argued that the shape of the district was largely attributed to incum-
bent protection and the desire to unite certain communities of interest around Dallas
into one district.
2
The Court, however, said it found nothing from the facts at trial to overturn the
District Court's ruling that race was the predominant factor in the redistricting plan.
The Court pointed to two facts: (1) the state did not have any evidence or data about
whether communities of shared interests even existed and (2) the decision to draw
districts based on race was made before any data was compiled on whether communi-
ties of shared interest existed."v The Court said it had a more difficult time with the
incumbent protection argument, but dispensed with that justification as well. The Court
stated that incumbent protection, as opposed to race, could better explain the decision
to ignore traditional districting principles. However, the Court found that District 30
was drawn using race as a proxy for a political gerrymander. The Court supported the
District Court's findings that race was the predominant factor in drawing the district's
lines and that any political foundation for the district was established by the use of
120. Id. at 1952.
121. Id. at 1952-53.
122. Id. at 1953.
123. Id. at 1954.
124. The two districts are adjoining, and are located in and around the Houston met-
ropolitan area.
125. Id. at 1953-54.
126. Id. at 1954-55.




Lastly, the Court found that District 30 provided prima facie evidence of the use
of race in drawing the district combined with the use of the REDAPPL program in
drawing the redistricting plan.'29 With this evidence, the Court sustained the District
Court's holding that District 30's shape was "unexplainable in terms other than
race."''" The Court found that, while the use of race was intertwined with other com-
plex decisions based on other principles, race was the predominant factor, and made
District 30 warrant strict scrutiny.'
With regard to Districts 18 and 29, the Court's holding was more blunt. The
Court stated that the two districts were not only bizarrely-shaped, but also clearly
showed "utter disregard of city limits, local election precincts, and voter tabulation
lines." ' The state again noted that the main focus of the redistricting plan was in-
cumbent protection. However, the Court explained that the bizarre shape of the dis-
tricts, like in Shaw I, showed that race overcame any other concerns that may have
been a part of the redistricting process. The Court also pointed to the state's submis-
sion for preclearance to the Attorney General as evidence of the state's intent to maxi-
mize minority voting strength proving that race was the overriding concern going into
the process. These factors led the Court to hold that strict scrutiny applied to all three
districts.'33
After finding that strict scrutiny applied to all three districts, the Court began
their determination of whether the districts were narrowly tailored to serve a compel-
ling state interest. The state provided three compelling interests: "the interest in avoid-
ing liability under the 'results' test of VRA §2(b), the interest in remedying past and
present racial discrimination, and the 'nonretrogression' principle of VRA §5 (for Dis-
trict 18 only). '"" The Court proceeded to analyze each proffered interest separately.
Justice O'Connor, in the majority opinion, stated that the Court assumes that
compliance with the results test of Section 2 can be a compelling state interest. The
Court also permits a certain amount of leeway under the narrowly tailored analysis to
further that interest. If a state draws a "reasonably compact" district, it may pass strict
scrutiny without showing that it is better than alternative districts submitted to the
Court by parties alleging injury. The problem arises when states use race as an over-
riding factor in the redistricting process. The Court stated that Texas' three districts
passed the second and third Gingles tests for Section 2, but argued that the minority
communities in question were not sufficiently compact to warrant the districts drawn,
The Court stated that Section 2 does not require a state to draw a bizarrely shaped
district, since it requires the minority population for which the district was drawn to be
geographically compact. If a reasonably compact district cannot be drawn, then Section
2 does not require it to be drawn. Thus, the state went beyond what Section 2 provides
and lost that as a compelling interest.'35
Justice O'Connor also pointed out that the Miller decision should not be read as
128. Id. at 1955-56.
129. Id. at 1957.
130. Id. at 1958.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1959.
133. Id. at 1959-60.
134. Id. at 1960.
135. Id. at 1960-62.
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requiring bizarre shape to trigger strict scrutiny. Rather, she explained that the presence
of a bizarrely shaped district is circumstantial evidence of an unjustified racial classifi-
cation, which is the essential constitutional harm to be remedied. The harm that bi-
zarrely shaped districts inflict, according to Justice O'Connor, is the impression that the
"political identity" of the district is based solely on race created by the non-presence of
traditional districting principles. 3 '
The Court then analyzed Texas' proposed interest in remedying the effects of
past and present racial discrimination. Texas argued on appeal that the predominant
harm to be redressed was vote dilution caused by invidious and longstanding discrimi-
natory practices. The Court stated that this argument was the same one Texas gave for
its compliance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. In Shaw I, the Court held that
a state must use sound districting principles and have a geographically compact racial
minority in order for this interest to be considered compelling. The Court explained
that under this standard, the remedial purposes argument is subsumed by the Section 2
defense, and that the Court previously ruled that the districts were not narrowly tai-
lored. 37
The state also attempted to justify its redistricting plan by arguing that District
18 was drawn in order to comply with Section 5. Justice O'Connor drew a distinction
between maintaining the proportion of minority voters in each district to their percent-
age of the overall voting population and increasing that percentage in a particular
district. O'Connor interpreted the nonretrogression provisions under Section 5 to man-
date that the state cannot diminish, either directly or indirectly, the opportunity of
minorities to elect the candidate of their choice. O'Connor argued that the
nonretrogression principle does not mean that a state can take whatever action it deems
necessary to preserve or create a certain outcome. The Court held in Shaw I that a
redistricting plan would not be considered narrowly tailored if it did more than was
"reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression."'38 The Court determined that the Texas
Legislature went beyond what was reasonably necessary, and that the districts were not
narrowly tailored.'39
Justice O'Connor concluded by stating that the Court was aware of the complexi-
ty inherent in the redistricting process, and that absolute rules governing the process
are impossible to create. Justice O'Connor expressed the majority's desire to let the
redistricting question remain the province of the state legislatures, and to let courts
play a role only when the Constitution is violated. The majority further expressed its
hope that the recent cases on voting rights will serve as a guide to the rough constitu-
tional boundaries that the states must honor in drawing districts. Finally, the Court
appealed to the states to use caution in ensuring that districts are drawn fairly and
according to accepted principles. In doing so, the Court said it wanted to honor its
"commitment" to keep government from using racial stereotypes in lawmaking."
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, said the existence of District 6 makes it less cer-
tain that race was the dominant factor over incumbent protection. Justice Stevens found
the facts at trial indicated that the Texas Legislature was concerned about race to the
136. Id. at 1962.
137. Id. at 1962-63.
138. Id. at 1963.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1963-64.
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extent necessary to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The Legislature was more
concerned, speculated Justice Stevens, about incumbency protection. He argued that
this evidence was discounted by both the District Court and the majority of the Su-
preme Court because neither liked that justification. Instead, the evidence of incumbent
protection needed to be looked at with the rest of the evidence at hand, and Justice
Stevens accused the Court of failing to do so.'4'
Justice Stevens said that the bizarre shape of District 30 in particular was an
indication of a complex and multi-faceted redistricting plan than one solely determined
by racial interests. Instead, Stevens contended that race was used as a proxy for politi-
cal purposes only to fine-tune the district's shape. Justice Stevens posited that a rea-
sonable reading of the facts would show that District 30 was drawn more in line with
political considerations than to purely maximize minority voting strength.142
Justice Stevens drew two conclusions from the facts of the case: first, the Texas
Legislature had a compelling interest in complying with the Voting Rights Act and the
plan was narrowly tailored as it only went so far as to ensure compliance;'43 second,
redistricting is best left to state legislatures. By disregarding the complexity of the
redistricting process, as Justice Stevens argued the majority did, the Court showed a
disregard for the state legislature. Finally, he argued that it is dangerous to put state
legislatures on the defensive, because too many restrictions on the process may lead
states to choose not to follow the Voting Rights Act at all.'"
In his dissent, Justice Souter predicted that Shaw I would result in a confusion
that the Court has had opportunity to clear up, but has not. 45 Justice Souter argued
that the Court failed to do two things: one, to define the necessary harm needed to
bring a claim under the new racial gerrymander cases; and two, to define a judicially
manageable standard for the districting principles that are allowed to be used.'" The
"predominant factor" and "in substantial disregard for customary and traditional
districting practices" standards articulated by the Court in previous cases, Justice
Souter said, are insufficient. Because race can be such a large influence in elections
themselves, Souter argued that it cannot be separated from traditional districting princi-
ples. 4 ' If these continue to be the "standards" that the Court applies in redistricting
litigation, then there will be no incentive for states to take substantial action to avoid
minority vote dilution. The Court essentially told the states, said Justice Souter, that
there is a small tolerance for error. If this continues, counsels Justice Souter, then there
will be too much confusion for rational action, and the states will simply opt for inac-
tion instead.'"
VIH. WHAT TO DO, WHAT TO DO?
Since North Carolina and Texas both planned to use their new redistricting plans
for the 1996 elections, there was a scramble in both states to determine which districts
to use in place of the proposed districts that were struck down by the Supreme Court.
141. Id. at 1984-86.
142. Id. at 1987-89.
143. Id. at 1989.
144. Id. at 1990-92.
145. Id. at 1998.
146. Id. at 2003-04.
147. Id. at 2005.
148. Id. at 2009.
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In North Carolina, the three judge panel that decided Shaw v. Hunt ruled that the plan
struck down by the Supreme Court would be used for the 1996 elections, and that the
General Assembly would be required to draw new districts by April 1, 1997, in time
for the 1998 elections.'49 The panel explained that the cost to the taxpayers of hold-
ing new primaries would be too great a burden and that the shape of the Twelfth Dis-
trict was such that to redraw it would require all the surrounding districts to be re-
drawn.50 The ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Court affirmed.,
In June, 1996, immediately after the Court's holding in Bush v. Vera, Texas
Governor George W. Bush, a Republican, stated that he wanted new districts drawn
before the November 1996 elections. He did not, however, call a special session of the
legislature to do this. Rather, he hoped that the parties to the lawsuit could reach a
settlement.'52 There were irreconcilable differences between what the state wanted
and what the plaintiffs wanted. The plaintiffs looked to have 26 of the state's 30 dis-
tricts redrawn, while the state wanted only districts redrawn. Furthermore, the state and
the Department of Justice asked that the task be delayed until 1998 so that the Texas
Legislature, rather than the court, could redistrict. 3
The only way the legislature would have the chance to redistrict, according to the
three-judge panel assigned to decide this case, was if the Governor called a special
session. The Governor could either let the Democrat-controlled Legislature draw the
new districts or let a more conservative judicial panel make the decision. In fact, two
of the judges on the panel were Reagan appointees, and the other was appointed by the
Governor's father. 5' Based on this, Governor Bush did not call a special session and
left redistricting to the court.
No settlement was reached, and the panel, after reviewing suggested plans sub-
mitted by both Democrats and Republicans, redrew the districts surrounding Houston
and Dallas. These 13 new districts will vote in an open election. This means that the
results of the party primaries will be disregarded, and thus anyone can run as a candi-
date in those districts. There will be no straight-party voting, and if a candidate does
not receive a clear majority in the November election, a run-off will be held on De-
cember 10. '5 Further, the court ordered the Legislature to enact a new redistricting
plan during its 1997 term, to be used in the 1998 elections.'56 The order was chal-
lenged by the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund and Democrats, but the
Supreme Court rejected their last-minute appeal, letting the new districts stand.'57
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31, 1996, at IA.
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152. R.A. Dyer and R.G. Ratcliffe, Bush Wants New District Lines Soon, Hous. CHRoN., June
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IX. REDISTRICTING: THEORY AND PRACTICE
As it stands today, the Supreme Court's recent decisions on the validity of certain
racial gerrymanders leave open a number of issues that will have a lasting effect on
the future of redistricting. This section discusses some of the effects these cases will
have and examines the proper role of the Court in redistricting issues. This list of
effects is by no means exhaustive, but they are the main issues facing state legislatures
in the aftermath of the Court's rulings.
A. Standing
The Court's position on the standing necessary to bring a claim of improper
racial gerrymandering is the starting point of the confusion surrounding the current
voting rights cases. After Hays, Shaw I and Miller, the Court has essentially allowed a
plaintiff who has not suffered a cognizable injury to sue under a claim of improper
racial gerrymandering. Shaw I and Miller accord standing to individuals who claim
they are injured by racial integration-or at least racial integration in which whites do
not remain the predominant group."' " The Court now allows anyone who is placed
in a district which may have been the product of a racial gerrymander to sue, along
with those whose voting power was actually affected. Moreover, all these districts
were challenged before any elections took place with the new districts in force. The
basis of the claim is not that there was an actual injury, but that there existed the prob-
ability that an injury would occur with the districts as they were drawn. The voters
who bring these suits are concerned with the same problem that these districts are
drawn to resolve: inadequate representation. Vote dilution claims rest on the belief that
the affected voter does not have the ability to meaningfully elect the representative of
his or her choice. Just as this is the fear of minority voters in a white-majority district,
so too is it the fear of white voters in a majority-minority district.
When the Supreme Court stated in Shaw I that minority voters are represented as
well as the majority voters in a district, it gave credence to the arguments of the white
voters that they had been victim to racial classification, at the same time discounting
minority voting strength claims. If the Court believes that minority voters have equal
access to the political process in a white majority district, then the Court should have
no problem with white voters being the minority in a majority-minority district, as the
whites would have the same access to the political process. It is as Professor Pamela
Karlan said: it is essentially the integration of white voters into a majority-minority
district that is being remedied, not the representational harm.
In effect, the Court is not attempting to remedy a particular harm, but is rather
using these cases to oversee this part of the political system. The standing requirements
are simply ensuring the ability of courts to review, case by case, the product of the
state legislatures. It is now evident that in cases of racial gerrymandering, it is more
likely than not that a suit will be filed when there is a scintilla of evidence that race
was a motivating factor in drawing districts. In placing itself in such a supervisory
role, the Court has imprudently taken the judiciary into an area in which political forc-
es do and should play the dominant role.
158. Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era,
26 CUMB. L. REV. 287, 293 (1995-96).
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B. Three Conceptions of the Right to Vote
Before discussing the proper role of the judiciary in redistricting claims, there is
a theory of the role of voting in the political process that merits debate. Professor
Karlan's theory' 9 on the conception of the right to vote contends that there are three
levels of impact that voting has on the political process. The first level is voting as
participation. This level simply holds that a person has the right to cast a vote that is
counted. Karlan sees this level as the essence of "civic inclusion ' ' "w that by voting a
person becomes part of a larger community, and is able to "participate fully in com-
munity governance by casting a ballot. '16 This level of voting is seen in the earliest
voting rights cases, where the Court struck down poll taxes and literacy tests as prereq-
uisites to voting. However, according to Karlan, this level also assumes that the right
to participate will conform to the voting procedures already in place, such as the abili-
ty to vote only for those names on the ballot and registration regulations.'62
The second level is voting as aggregation. At this level, voting is not simply to
define the system of governance in a community, but is instead the aggregation of
individual votes to reach a collective decision. Thus, claims brought under the aggrega-
tion theory are generally either claims by individuals that they are part of a discrete
group of voters whose collective voice is being ignored, or are brought by the group
itself. Karlan explains that this theory perpetuates two types of claims: those claims
that argue that the minority has been placed in a district in which their voice is over-
whelmed by the majority, like vote dilution or racial gerrymanders, and those claims
that argue that structural rules within the voting system have diluted the voice of a
discrete class of voters.'63
The problem at this level, according to Karlan, is that the Court has decided
these cases without a firm baseline of what the results of a fair aggregation of voters
would be. Karlan explains that the second level of analysis has a results-based compo-
nent, in that the claims brought under this level assert that the dilution of a group's
voting strength will have the effect of denying that group the ability to effectively elect
the candidate of their choice. Without a firm baseline for what results would be fair
under this level of analysis, the Court instead proposed that vote dilution claims do not
have to prove that the voter or aggregate of voters was unable to elect the candidate of
their choice, but that voters have been altogether cut off from the political process."
Karlan identifies the legal question at the aggregate level as this: "[T]he critical ques-
tion for an individual cannot simply be whether she can elect her preferred candidate.
Rather, it must focus on whether the system for selecting the entire governmental body
gives her an effective opportunity to participate in policymaking."'65
The third level of analysis is voting as governance. This level of analysis shifts
the voter's focus from concern as to the voter's own representative to an interest in the
overall makeup of the representative body. At this level, voting is not a procedure, but
159. This theory is outlined in Pamela Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About
Formalism, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1705, 1709-20 (1993).
160. Id. at 1710.
161. Id. at 1711.
162. Id. at 1712.
163. Id. at 1713-14.
164. Id. at 1714-16.
165. Id. at 1716.
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part of an ongoing participatory involvement in policymaking. While election of one's
own representative serves the immediate interests of the voter, there is an ancillary, but
nonetheless important, interest in ensuring that the voter's representative will have the
opportunity to represent his or her constituents in the legislative body. That is, the
voter wants not only to have a vote that counts in the aggregate, but also wants to
have a representative that counts as well. Claims brought at this level not only concern
vote dilution, but also seek to bring the voting strength of the minority-elected repre-
sentative to a level commensurate with the percentage of the minority group to the
whole of the voting public."
Karlan describes her three levels of voting rights as being part of a continuum,
with the recent cases decided by the Court located somewhere between the second and
third levels. The problem with the Court's analysis of voting rights claims is that the
Court has taken an overly simplistic view of the remedies necessary to solve the prob-
lem of racial factionalism in voting. Karlan warns that the remedies for voting rights
claims must deal with the fact that there still is a large white majority that threatens to
overwhelm the voice of minority voters. While the Court must be wary of
factionalizing voters based on race, according to Karlan, it must also provide for
some assurance that a minority's voice will be heard if the Court truly wants to involve
itself in redistricting. Thus, the Court must pay particular attention to the different
political cultures of each jurisdiction before applying an overall rule.16
C. Theory Meets the Real World
As Professor Karlan duly points out, the process behind redistricting is a com-
plex one, and presents a number of problems to the Court. The Court, though, has
entered into an area previously dominated by political currents. As a result, many have
called the Court's participation in this area into serious question. With the sole purpose
of effectuating change in only one area of this complex issue, this intervention not
only places the Court in a precarious position, but it also constrains the states in such a
way as to make redistricting exceedingly difficult and potentially unfair.
The Court chose to take an individual-based approach to the redistricting ques-
tion instead of looking at voting as both an individual and a group activity. Some
argue that voting as an individual is irrational, since one single vote among the com-
paratively vast number of votes cast is inconsequential, but that voting in the aggregate
is a rational activity. In Shaw I, the Court asserted that in redistricting, people are to be
thought of as individuals, not as member of a racial class. However, it is evident that
people do vote in the aggregate-voters are as concerned about the entire makeup of
the representative body as they are concerned that the candidate they voted for has a
chance of being elected.
The Court, in taking the individual approach to voting rights, ignores the
individual's interest in being represented in a real manner, not just having a vote in a
particular election. The Court states in Shaw I that if black voters are placed in a par-
ticular district, a message is sent to the representative that they are to cater to the
concerns of the black majority in the district. The Court reasoned that it is better for
the black population to remain as a strong minority in the district that they are already
166. Id. at 1716-19.
167. Id. at 1719-40.
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in, and that the representative of that district will represent their concerns as vehement-
ly as he or she represents the majority. This is an overly idyllic notion of our represen-
tative system. The fact is that elected representatives are interested first and foremost
in retaining their position as an elected representative. That means in a nutshell that a
representative will represent the interest of the majority bloc that got him or her elect-
ed. Taken further, if a minority view conflicts with a majority view, then the majority
view will likely prevail. While it is admirable and desirable for the Court to advocate a
system of full representation, it simply does not work that way.
If there did exist a system of full representation, there would be no lobbyists at
state capitols trying to persuade legislators to draw majority-minority districts. The
Texas Legislature would not have received pressure from interest groups if their mi-
nority population felt that they were adequately represented by the representatives of
the districts they belonged to at the time. Further, those minority groups would not feel
shut out of the political system if their main concern was whether they were able to
cast a vote at all. Their concern lies in the aggregate; their concern lies in the ability of
a representative to be effective in the representative body. It is in that way that Profes-
sor Karlan's theory works to show the fallacy of certain assumptions made by the
Court.
D. Why The Court Doesn't Belong
While it is important for the Court to ensure that the redistricting process does
not unfairly group people into districts based on race, the Court nevertheless must be
careful to acknowledge the presence of race in the political process. By adding further
complexity to compliance with the Voting Rights Act, the Court took away the incen-
tive states had to engage in voluntary compliance. There are many reasons why the
Court should not intrude on the otherwise political process of redistricting. The first
reason is that the Court cannot begin to understand the complexity of the political
culture in every state. As it was shown in testimony during Shaw I and Bush v. Vera,
there was a balance of many competing interests that led to the final redistricting plan.
The Court was not in the position then, and is not now, to determine what the predom-
inant factor was at the time. While state legislators may have indicated that a large
concern was minority voting strength, the Court took that to mean that voters were
improperly characterized based on their race.
For the Court to say that race should not be used as a predominant factor in
redistricting is incredible. The Court again uses an individual approach to the question,
arguing that individuals vote, not groups. If that were the case, election strategists
could save a lot of money by eliminating demographers. It is undeniable that race
plays a factor in elections. More importantly, racial groups in similar economic and so-
cial positions have a formidable impact in electoral politics. State legislators, when
acting to draw district lines, look at how groups vote in order to draw the district lines
that support incumbents and provide a district map which promotes their party. In
recent cases, the Court has argued that this is using race by proxy as a means to anoth-
er goal, and is impermissible; it has conversely argued that a district drawn for purely
political reasons is permissible. To separate these two arguments ignores the influence
that minority groups in the aggregate have on the political system. It is too simple a
view of the political system.
The second reason why the Court should not intrude in redistricting is that the
Court has essentially allowed the federal courts to draw districts instead of impressing
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1997] Legislative Gerrymandering 145
the importance of leaving it to the state legislatures. This, combined with the confusion
that the new redistricting standards caused, will ultimately lead to the abdication of
redistricting duties by state legislatures in favor of letting the federal district court
draw districts. This is already happening. When Miller was remanded to the District
Court, the state asked the court to draw the new district lines instead of the legislature.
And, as discussed earlier, the district lines used in the Texas elections in November
were drawn by the court because Governor Bush decided that the court's district plan
would be better for the Republicans than a plan drawn by the Legislature had a special
session been called. In North Carolina, the district court did not draw districts, but in-
stead allowed elections to be held in the unconstitutional districts only until 1997,
when new lines are drawn by the General Assembly.
Any abdication of redistricting duties by the state legislatures results in taking
redistricting out of the political arena and opening the door for judicial redistricting. As
was said before, the judiciary is in no position to make a determination based on the
complexity of the political process in each state. The Court, in its series of 5-4 deci-
sions, illustrates the absence of agreement as to how it interprets the appropriateness of
districts and how they should be drawn. For instance, Justice White in his dissent in
Shaw I interpreted the drawing of District 12 as more a product of political concerns
than of a district drawn solely with race in mind." 8 This alone shows that there is
more than just one interest influencing redistricting. The absence of a judicially man-
ageable standard for drawing districts, in addition to the complexity of issues facing
the drawing of district lines, makes it impossible for the courts to take over the role
that properly belongs to the state legislatures.
X. CONCLUSION
Redistricting will be difficult in the future because there are now two standards
to which redistricting plans are subject to. If those standards are viewed within
Karlan's theory, the problem lies in the variety of inconsistent levels of voting analysis
used by the Attorney General and in the courts. The Attorney General interpreted
voting as an aggregate activity, while the Supreme Court interpreted it as an individual
activity. The Voting Rights Act synthesizes these two views. As a whole, the Voting
Rights Act was designed to ensure that every American citizen be allowed to enjoy his
or her right to vote with minimal hindrances or qualifications. Taken separately, Sec-
tions 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act are protections of an aggregate right to vote,
providing for the protection of minority voting strength and for preclearance in coun-
ties that discriminated in the past. An interpretive problem lies in the difference in the
nature of the right to vote under the aggregate theory versus the individual theory. The
Attorney General, applying the aggregate theory, understands the Voting Rights Act as
a tool to protect the rights of blacks as a group. This results in a program of minority
voting strength maximization that has caused the Attorney General to deny
preclearance to plans. Ultimately, this view will lead to a guarantee of results over a
guarantee of opportunity.
The Court, on the other hand, followed the individual theory of voting rights. As
such, the Court admonished the Attorney General for denying preclearance and recom-
mending that districts be drawn pursuant to maximization plans. The Court interpreted
168. 509 U.S. at 658-75.
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the last sentence of Section 2 to mean that there is no guarantee of results, only a
guarantee of opportunity. The Court explained that the maximization program followed
by the Attorney General are contrary to the express provisions of the Voting Rights
Act. It is the province of Congress to step in and provide some standard or guideline
for the Attorney General to follow in the preclearance process. Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act expressly provides that redistricting plans may not deny minority groups
either the ability to elect representatives of their choice, or the ability to participate in
the political process. The interpretation of this section depends on what one considers
to be meaningful participation. Those who subscribe to the individual theory would
agree that the ability to cast a vote is sufficient participation. However, those who
follow the aggregate theory or the voting as governance theory see participation not
only as the right to cast a vote, but also the right to have a representative that reflects
the minority group's viewpoint in the legislature. Under these theories, participation is
being reasonably able to make some impact in the legislature once elected.
Although the latter may be deemed to be a guarantee of results outside the scope
of the Voting Rights Act, it can also be characterized as a greater opportunity that a
minority group will have a voice in the representative body. Congress needs to define
what it considers to be meaningful participation and to what extent the states and the
Attorney General may pursue that end. Further, Congress needs to identify the scope
of the Court's authority to oversee the matter. Specifically, Congress must provide
guidelines for redistricting when minority voting strength is a concern.
Professor Karlan explained the dispute this way:
The real friction between the Voting Rights Act and wrongful districting jurispru-
dence is not doctrinal but pragmatic and institutional. The combination of lax
standing requirements, ideological and partisan incentives to sue, and a receptive,
activist federal judiciary guarantees that jurisdictions will find themselves walking
a tightrope. If they do not draw majority-black districts in most areas with substan-
tial black populations, they will find it difficult to obtain preclearance and, if they
do, will face traditional section 2 lawsuits. But if they do draw those districts, they
will find themselves embroiled in wrongful districting litigation. There is now no
realistic way for a jurisdiction to avoid costly and divisive litigation. It makes sense
for the Court to step in when there are individuals or groups being denied their
right to participate or to have their votes fairly counted or to have their views taken
into account in the legislative process. By contrast, when complainants have suf-
fered no particularized injury, but simply object to the prevailing democratic theo-
ry, the Court's intervention is entirely unjustified. 'In the last analysis, what lies at
the core of this controversy is a difference of opinion as to the function of repre-
sentative government,' [citation omitted], precisely the kind of question that should
be hammered out in the political process.
The problems in this area are threefold: 1) the Court has opened the door to vast
amounts of Voting Rights Act litigation by enlarging the standing necessary to make a
claim; 2) the Attorney General and the Court have different views on the nature of the
right to vote; and 3) the Voting Rights Act does not provide the necessary guidance for
either states or the Attorney General to follow in redistricting and preclearance.
Congress can rectify the situation by providing a definition for meaningful participa-
169. Karlan, supra note 170 at 210.
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tion. In doing so, Congress needs to decide if the protected right here is an individual
one or an aggregate one. States must then decide if they need to protect the voting
rights of each individual member of a minority group or if they need to protect the
rights of a group as a whole. Only then can accurate measurements be taken to assure
the adequate protection of the right to vote.
Congress also needs to give the Attorney General a standard for review in the
preclearance process. If the Attorney General is given guidelines in preclearance, then
states will be able to redistrict with adequate knowledge of preclearance necessities. It
would add predictability to the system by not only ensuring more effective redistricting
legislation, but also eliminating confusion. By defining the scope of the Voting Rights
Act more clearly, and by providing a model to follow, Congress can reduce costly
litigation. Doing so will also provide better assurance that the rights of minority groups
will be protected legitimately and evenly. If changes are not implemented, then we can
only expect more of the same.
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